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THE DECLINE OF TENURE: THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S 
INTERPRETATION OF ACADEMIC TENURE’S SUBSTANTIVE 
PROTECTIONS 
John M. Badagliacca* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Academic tenure has played an instrumental role in shaping 
higher education in America over the past century.  In the most basic 
sense, academic tenure provides job security to employees in the 
academic field after a specified probationary period.1  William Van 
Alstyne, an American law professor, provides a helpful definition in 
his defense of tenure: “[t]enure, accurately and unequivocally 
defined, lays no claim whatever to a guarantee of lifetime 
employment.  Rather, tenure provides only that no person 
continuously retained as a full-time faculty member beyond a 
specified lengthy period of probationary service may thereafter be 
dismissed without adequate cause.”2  Van Alstyne’s definition is 
important because it emphasizes one of the crucial aspects of 
academic tenure—employee dismissal only for “adequate cause.”3 
Tenure provides both substantive and procedural protections to 
the tenured employee.  The substantive protections prevent unlawful 
dismissal—dismissal without adequate cause—while the procedural 
protections ensure that employers follow a certain process during the 
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 1  CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 403 
(1993). 
 2  William Van Alstyne, Tenure: A Summary, Explanation, and “Defense,” 57 AAUP 
BULL 328 (1971) (emphasis in original). 
 3  Throughout the history of academic tenure scholars, courts, lawyers, and 
others have used the term “adequate cause” intermittently with “just cause” and 
“good cause.”  For this Comment, all three phrases mean the same thing: the cause 
needed to properly dismiss a tenured professor. 
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employment and dismissal of any tenured employees.  Academic 
tenure also includes the concept of “academic freedom,” or the 
ability of professors to teach material in the way they see fit without 
worrying about the pressures of censorship or overt administrative 
restriction.  This Comment analyzes the rights provided by academic 
tenure and discusses the history and the reasoning for the adoption 
of academic tenure in American colleges and universities. 
Specifically, this Comment discusses whether tenure, as an 
academic and legal concept, affords professors specific rights outside 
of their employment contracts, or in the alternative, whether tenure 
is an abstract concept that simply affords professors more freedom in 
their pedagogical philosophies while providing no legal authority for 
continuous employment outside of their employment contracts.  The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit chose the latter 
in its interpretation of academic tenure in Branham v. Thomas M. 
Cooley Law School.4  Lynn Branham was a tenured law professor at the 
Thomas M. Cooley Law School who was terminated in December 
2006.5  The court ruled that Branham’s tenure status did not afford 
her any specific rights beyond those set forth in her employment 
contract.6 
This Comment argues that the concept of academic tenure in 
American higher education today implicitly affords tenured 
professors procedural and substantive protections from termination.  
These protections exist as tools to ensure that professors’ academic 
freedom will remain uninhibited after a probationary period in which 
the professors earn the right to its protections.  In Branham, the Sixth 
Circuit separated the job security aspect of academic tenure from the 
academic freedom aspect, and treated tenure as a purely pedagogical 
concept.  This interpretation reduces tenure to an almost 
meaningless legal concept that affords no real employment 
protections.  The concepts of tenure as a grant of job security and 
tenure as a grant of academic freedom are not mutually exclusive; 
they are interdependently linked.  One cannot exist without the 
other.  This interdependent concept of tenure allows the educational 
system to progress, and to divide this concept is to endanger the very 
system it was designed to protect.  For these reasons the Sixth Circuit 
erred in its interpretation of tenure. 
This Comment serves as both a discussion of the legal 
 
 4  689 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 5  Id. at 561.  
 6  Id. at 562. 
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interpretation of tenure and a defense of tenure in American higher 
education.  Part II of this Comment sets forth the history of tenure in 
American higher education.  It examines the evolution of tenure, the 
standards set forth by academic and legal organizations, and the 
industry standards in American higher education.  Part III discusses 
the Branham case and its holding.  Part IV addresses the nationwide 
implications of the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of tenure and argues 
that Branham’s tenure provided legal authority for her job security 
regardless of the one-year duration of her most recent employment 
contract.  It also discusses the effect of the Branham ruling on 
professors’ future job security and on their ability to exercise 
academic freedom.  Finally, Part V examines the contemporary 
opinions on tenure in American higher education in relation to the 
Branham ruling. 
II. HISTORY OF TENURE IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 
The history of specific legal protection for scholars can be traced 
back to twelfth-century Europe.7  In 1158, Emperor Frederick 
Barbarossa8 issued the Authentica Habita, an edict that promised 
scholars safe passage in their travels, protection from attack upon 
their homes, and compensation for unlawful injury.9  This twelfth-
century edict shows how, even hundreds of years ago, western 
civilization understood the need to afford certain protections to 
those who pursued scholarly work and who would in turn pass on 
their knowledge to the next generation.  Special protection for 
 
 7  Walter P. Metzger, Academic Tenure in America: A Historical Essay, in FACULTY 
TENURE: A REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COMMISSION ON ACADEMIC TENURE 
IN HIGHER EDUCATION 93, 94 (1973) [hereinafter Metzger, Academic Tenure in 
America].  
 8  Frederick I Barbarossa was a German-born Holy Roman Emperor who ruled 
from 1152 to 1190, and is widely considered one of the most influential figures of his 
time.  MEDIEVAL GERMANY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 380 (John M. Jeep ed., 2001).  
Barbarossa’s reign represented a highpoint of German power, and his influence on 
the German people remained long after his death:  
[The Empire’s] territory had been wider under Charles, its strength perhaps greater 
under Henry III; but it never appeared in such pervading vivid activity, never shone 
with such lustre of chivalry, as under the prince whom his countrymen have taken to 
be one of their national heroes, and who is still, as the mythic type of Teutonic 
character, honoured by picture and statue, in song and in legend, through the 
breadth of the German lands. 
JAMES BRYCE, THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE 72 (1864).  Barbarossa’s edict undoubtedly 
influenced later German concepts regarding special protections for scholars and 
academics.  See infra text accompanying notes 21–27. 
 9  Metzger, Academic Tenure in America, supra note 7, at 94.  
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educators, however, did not become a part of the American 
educational system until relatively recently.  Tenure did not reach 
American schools until the latter half of the nineteenth century, and 
the modern concept of academic tenure did not exist until the 
beginning of the twentieth century.10  The concept of tenure took 
time to develop in the United States, and did not emerge as a 
fundamental doctrine of American education until the oldest 
institutions of higher learning were forced to adapt to the progressive 
academic movement at the turn of the twentieth century.11 
A. Origins of Tenure in the United States 
In early nineteenth-century America, colleges anchored 
themselves in tradition.  By centering themselves in tradition, 
American colleges were paternalistic, authoritarian, and extremely 
skeptical of youth.12  Institutions of higher education focused on the 
importance of Christianity, classical studies, and discipline.13  This 
pedagogical mindset left very little room for intellectual creativity.14  
At that time, professorial appointments usually lasted indefinitely and 
continued as long as the professor exhibited good behavior.15  
Although these indefinite appointments existed, there was no legal 
precedent to support the presumption that the professor should be 
allowed to continue his employment absent adequate cause for 
dismissal.16  As a result, the professor could be fired at will in many 
institutions without any substantive or procedural protections.17  The 
courts, not wanting to get involved in universities’ administrative 
decisions, allowed university boards to govern themselves regarding 
 
 10  See generally WALTER P. METZGER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF THE 
UNIVERSITY (1955) (attributing tenure’s development in American schools to, among 
others: the rise of Darwinism and German pedagogical influences in the second half 
of the nineteenth century; the emergence of the university as a research institution 
and the unprecedented support from big businesses in the late nineteenth century; 
and the establishment of the AAUP in the beginning of the twentieth century). 
 11  Id. at 194 (“The establishment of the American Association of University 
Professors in 1915 . . . was the beginning of an era in which the principles of 
academic freedom were codified, and in which violations of academic freedom were 
systematically investigated and penalized.”). 
 12  Id. at 4–5. 
 13  Id.  
 14  Id. 
 15  RICHARD HOFSTADTER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF THE COLLEGE 230 
(1955). 
 16  Id. 
 17  Id. 
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faculty hiring and firing decisions.18  All appointments were, in a legal 
sense, temporary and instantly extinguishable.19  The norms and 
standards regarding professorial employment also varied from school 
to school, and the standards of any given university depended largely 
on its location and the people in charge.20 
While academic tenure as a legal concept was unclear and 
undefined in America during the nineteenth century, that period 
marked the beginning of a cultural infusion that would reshape 
American thoughts on academic freedom.  In the nineteenth century 
over nine thousand Americans studied in German universities.21  
These returning students, along with German scholars teaching in 
the United States at the time, assimilated German methods and ideals 
into American higher education.22  One of the most important ideals 
that Germans brought to the United States was the concept of 
lehrfreiheit, which roughly translates to “teaching freedom,” and 
encompasses what we now call “academic freedom.”23 
Particularly, the concept of lehrfreiheit meant two things: (1) that 
a university professor was free to perform his own research and to 
report his findings through publication or lecture; and (2) that the 
professor enjoyed the “freedom of teaching and freedom of 
inquiry.”24  The Germans did not believe that adherence to lehrfreiheit 
was a voluntary choice for universities: “[t]his freedom was not, as the 
Germans conceived it . . . a superadded attraction of certain 
universities and not of others; rather, it was the distinctive prerogative 
of the academic profession, and the essential condition of all 
universities.”25  Lehrfreiheit also promoted the concept of limited 
administrative rules within the education system.26  Therefore, the 
German idea of academic freedom entailed the right of professors to 
teach without fear of dismissal, and promoted an atmosphere of 
 
 18  Metzger, Academic Tenure in America, supra note 7, at 133. 
 19  James J. Fishman, Tenure and Its Discontents: The Worst Form of Employment 
Relationship Save All of the Others, 21 PACE L. REV. 159, 164 (2000). 
 20  Metzger, Academic Tenure in America, supra note 7, at 135. 
 21  METZGER, supra note 10, at 93. 
 22  Id.  The German concept of giving professors and scholars specific protections 
traces all the way back to Emperor Barbarossa’s Authentica Habita.  See supra notes 8–9 
and accompanying texts. 
 23  Gregory M. Dickinson, Academic Tenure and the Divide Between Legal Academia 
and Legal Practice, 6 DARTMOUTH L.J. 318, 329–30 (2008). 
 24  METZGER, supra note 10, at 112–13. 
 25  Id. at 113.  
 26  Id. 
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administrative leniency surrounding the teaching process.27 
By the second half of the nineteenth century, the professoriate 
began organizing into specialized departments reflecting national 
specialist organizations.28  This created a more specialized faculty 
comprised of research scholars who could best be evaluated by their 
disciplinary peers rather than by administrators or lay trustees.29  After 
this shift, universities were only a short step away from adopting the 
belief that faculty should be involved in a quasi-judicial proceeding to 
determine whether another faculty member should be dismissed.30  
This new specialized faculty brought with it a conflict between 
professors and administrators.31  The more the professors explored 
and critiqued their own specialized field—delving into controversial 
topics and ideas—the angrier the administrators became.32  The 
divergence of traditional views in academia had previously been easy 
grounds for dismissal, but the turn-of-the-century technological 
advances and the philosophical shifts of the era resulted in a different 
outlook toward progressive academic thought.33  It became apparent 
that to continue the progression of the era, institutions of higher 
learning needed to promote greater academic freedom.34  While the 
technological advances of the industrial revolution created a demand 
for highly trained scientists, universities sought out professors with 
special skill-sets to provide their students with the education needed 
to keep with the progressive time period.35  In turn, these highly 
skilled professors demanded a great level of academic autonomy in 
order to advance the sciences.36  University leaders began publicly 
embracing the protection of progressive academic thought at the 
beginning of the twentieth century.37  In the 1907 commencement 
address, Harvard president Charles W. Eliot said: 
 
 27  Id. 
 28  Fishman, supra note 19, at 164.  These organizations were tailored to specific 
disciplines.  Id.  For example, history professors became part of the newly formed 
American Historical Association.  Id.  The American professor now belonged to a 
broad professional group (the faculty) and a narrower professional group within a 
specific discipline.  Id. 
 29  Dickinson, supra note 23, at 330. 
 30  Fishman, supra note 19, at 165.  
 31  Dickinson, supra note 23, at 330. 
 32  Id. 
 33  Id. at 331. 
 34  Id. 
 35  Id. 
 36  Id. 
 37  See, e.g., METZGER, supra note 10, at 124. 
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[S]o long as . . . boards of trustees of colleges and 
universities claim the right to dismiss at pleasure all the 
officers of the institutions in their charge, there will be no 
security for the teachers’ proper freedom . . . .  [I]t is easy 
for a department to become despotic, particularly if there 
be one dominant personage in it.38 
Eliot’s statement was one of the first to link academic freedom 
with the goal of avoiding administrative interference with faculty 
positions.39  At the time of Eliot’s commencement address, the 
American university was uprooting itself from its authoritarian past, 
allowing an opportunity for the modern tenure system to take hold.40 
B. The AAUP 
In 1900, Stanford University dismissed economics professor 
Edward A. Ross from his position due to his political and social 
views.41  Arthur Oncken Lovejoy, an associate professor at Stanford, 
resigned in protest of Ross’s dismissal.42  In 1913 Lovejoy, along with 
eighteen professors from Johns Hopkins University, wrote a letter to 
colleagues at other leading universities asking them to join in the 
formation of a national association of professors.43  The purpose of 
the association was to protect the institutional interests of faculty, 
specifically through the creation of general principles regarding 
tenure and the legitimate dismissal of faculty.44 
Professors around the country responded favorably to the 
Hopkins Letter, resulting in the establishment of the American 
Association of University Professors (AAUP) in 1915.45  The AAUP 
modeled itself after the American Bar Association in order to 
 
 38  Id. 
 39  Dickinson, supra note 23, at 331. 
 40  This tenure movement gained momentum in the early twentieth century, but 
still took time to develop: in 1913 a Wesleyan professor was dismissed for giving a 
speech in which he urged less rigid observance of the Sabbath.  See Metzger, Academic 
Tenure in America, supra note 7, at 146.   
 41  Metzger, Academic Tenure in America, supra note 7, at 138.  Jane Lathrop 
Stanford, the widow of Stanford University’s founder Leland Stanford, used her 
power as the sole trustee of the university to pressure the university into dismissing 
Ross.  Id.  Although Ross’s dismissal was a monumental event in the movement for 
the protection of academic freedom in America, Ross was no progressive role model.  
Stanford pushed for Ross’s removal after Ross publicly shared his hatred of non-
whites, specifically Chinese immigrants.  Id. 
 42  Id. at 137. 
 43  Id. at 135–37. 
 44  Fishman, supra note 19, at 166.  
 45  METZGER, supra note 10, at 194. 
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promote its desire to serve as a link between professionalism and 
academic freedom.46  In the same year of its establishment, the AAUP 
issued the 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and 
Academic Tenure.47  The report championed three elements of 
academic freedom: “freedom of inquiry and research, freedom of 
teaching within the university or college, and freedom of extramural 
utterance and action.”48  In 1940, the AAUP, in coordination with the 
Association of American Colleges (AAC), released a new statement of 
principles49—the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and 
Tenure (“1940 Statement”) received widespread endorsement and 
became one of the most influential of all such formularies.50 
The 1940 Statement defined tenure as a means to two specific 
ends: “(1) freedom of teaching and research and of extramural 
activities, and (2) a sufficient degree of economic security to make 
the profession attractive to men and women of ability.”51  With the 
new goals of tenure set forth, the AAUP then labeled freedom and 
economic security as “indispensable to the success of an institution in 
fulfilling its obligations to its students and to society.”52  The 1940 
Statement further demanded that, after a probationary period, 
teachers should have permanent or continuous tenure.53  After 
achieving tenure, the professor could not be terminated except for 
adequate cause.54  One of the shortcomings of the 1940 Statement was 
its failure to clearly define adequate cause, providing only “an 
oblique reference to moral turpitude and a suggestion as to how 
incompetence should be judged.”55  The 1940 Statement also sets forth 
an early framework for the procedural rights afforded to tenured 
professors: “[t]ermination for cause of a continuous appointment, or 
 
 46  Fishman, supra note 19, at 167.  
 47  See General Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure, 1 
AAUP BULL. 291 (1915), available at http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres
/A6520A9D-0A9A-47B3-B550-C006B5B224E7/0/ 
1915Declaration.pdf [hereinafter 1915 Declaration]. 
 48  Id. at 292. 
 49  Metzger, Academic Tenure in America, supra note 7, at 152; 1940 Statement of 
Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, in AAUP POLICY TENTH 3 (2d ed.), available 
at http://www.aaup.org/sites/default/files/principles-academic-freedom-tenure.pdf 
[hereinafter 1940 Statement of Principles]. 
 50  Metzger, Academic Tenure in America, supra note 7, at 152. 
 51  1940 Statement of Principles, supra note 49, at 3. 
 52  Id. 
 53  Id. at 4.  
 54  Id. 
 55  Metzger, Academic Tenure in America, supra note 7, at 153 n.91. 
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the dismissal for cause of a teacher previous to the expiration of a 
term appointment, should, if possible, be considered by both a 
faculty committee and the governing board of the institution.”56 
In 1958, the AAUP and AAC collaborated again to release a 
more detailed and stringent policy on the procedural standards for 
dismissals.57  This new policy stated that when the first reasons arise to 
question the fitness of a tenured faculty member, the administrative 
officer should first seek a personal conference with the faculty 
member.58  The faculty member may then request a hearing in order 
to determine whether he should be removed from the faculty 
position on the grounds stated.59  The faculty member had the right 
to counsel, to question all witnesses who testify orally, and to be 
confronted by all adverse witnesses.60  In addition, there must be a 
record of all of the evidence against the professor.61 
Since 1957, the AAUP has continuously released and revised a 
policy document titled Recommended Institutional Regulations on 
Academic Freedom and Tenure (“Recommended Regulations”).62  The 
document reflects the development of AAUP standards and 
procedures, and the most recent revision is from 2009.63  The 
opening lines of the Recommended Regulations state its purpose to 
“protect academic freedom and tenure and to ensure academic due 
process.”64  The Recommended Regulations specifically point out that 
dismissals of all forms of faculty members will not be a means of 
curbing academic freedom: “[a]dequate cause for a dismissal will be 
related, directly and substantially, to the fitness of faculty members in 
their professional capacities as teachers or researchers.  Dismissal will 
not be used to restrain faculty members in their exercise of academic 
freedom or other rights of American citizens.”65  The language of the 
 
 56  1940 Statement of Principles, supra note 49, at 4. 
 57  1958 Statement on Procedural Standards in Faculty Dismissal Proceedings, in AAUP 
POLICY TENTH 12 (2d ed.), available at http://www.aaup.org/file/standards-faculty-
dismissal.pdf. 
 58  Id. at 13. 
 59  Id. 
 60  Id. 
 61  Id. at 14.  
 62  AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, RECOMMENDED INSTITUTIONAL REGULATIONS ON 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE (2009), available at 
http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/E45D7D3B-00F1-4BC0-9D0A-322DF63A1D07/ 
0/RIR.pdf. 
 63  Id. 
 64  Id. at 1. 
 65  Id. at 4. 
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Recommended Regulations shows a conscious effort on the part of the 
AAUP to defend the idea that tenured professors can maintain job 
security without fear of arbitrary dismissal.  Almost one hundred years 
after its inception, the AAUP still champions the protection of 
academic freedom in American institutions, and reinforces that idea 
in its published works.66 
C. The American Bar Association 
Law schools are a particularly prominent subset of American 
institutions of higher learning.  Like some other graduate schools, 
law schools have the special quality of being linked to both the 
educational world and to the world of a specific and prominent 
profession.  Therefore, as members of educational institutions, law 
professors fall under the protection of the standards and regulations 
of the AAUP.67  But law professors, as members of the legal 
profession, may also find guidance and protection under the 
standards and regulations of the American Bar Association (ABA).68  
Every year, the ABA releases its Standards and Rules of Procedure for 
Approval of Law Schools (“ABA Standards”).69  The main purpose of the 
publication is to set forth the requirements law schools must meet in 
order to obtain and retain ABA approval.70  ABA accreditation is 
important because in most states, one must have attended an ABA 
accredited school in order to sit for the bar exam.71  Attending an 
ABA accredited school also ensures that the student will receive a 
nationally approved program of legal education.72 
The ABA Standards also set forth the standards and requirements 
that govern law school faculty at ABA accredited institutions.73  
Standard 405, labeled Professional Environment, states that “[a] law 
 
 66  See generally AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, http://www.aaup.org (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2013).  
 67  Id. 
 68  See ABA, ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW 
SCHOOLS vii (2012), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_educatio
n/Standards/2012_2013_aba_standards_and_rules.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter 
ABA STANDARDS]. 
 69  Id. 
 70  Id. 
 71  For more information on the ABA’s accreditation and approval of law schools 
see FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, http://www.americanbar.org
/groups/legal_education/resources/frequently_asked_questions.html.  
 72  See id. 
 73  ABA STANDARDS, supra note 68, at 29. 
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school shall have an established and announced policy with respect to 
academic freedom and tenure of which Appendix 1 herein is an 
example but is not obligatory.”74  Standard 405 also includes a set of 
interpretations to explain the standard.75  The explanation of tenure 
in interpretation 405-6 bears a heavy resemblance to the concept of 
tenure maintained by the AAUP: “[a]fter tenure is granted, the 
faculty member may be terminated only for good cause, including 
termination or material modification of the entire clinical 
program.”76  Interpretation 405-6 also grants specific protections to 
professors with long-term contract agreements.77  The trend and 
popularity of long-term contracts for faculty members will be 
discussed in more detail in Part IV infra. 
As mentioned above, the ABA Standards provide an example of a 
tenure policy for accredited law schools to adopt—since the schools 
must establish an academic tenure policy.  The example given by the 
ABA, labeled Statement on Academic Freedom and Tenure, is the exact 
text from the 1940 Statement issued by the AAUP.78  The ABA’s 
decision to adopt the AAUP’s policies on academic freedom and 
tenure as the template for law schools shows that the ABA accepts the 
AAUP’s regulations in matters regarding academic tenure.79  
Although the ABA Standards state that law schools do not have to 
adopt the exact example given, the ABA’s choice to use the 1940 
Statement as its tenure policy template is clearly an endorsement of 
the AAUP’s tenure policies.80 
D. Current Tenure Statistics 
The National Center for Education Statistics reported that in the 
fall of 2010, 46% of full-time professionals employed at post-
secondary schools (including law schools and other professional 
schools, but excluding medical schools) had faculty status.81  The 
 
 74  Id. at 32.  
 75  Id. at 33. 
 76  Compare id. at 33, with 1940 Statement of Principles, supra note 49, at 4. 
 77  ABA STANDARDS, supra note 68, at 33. 
 78  Compare id. at 161, with 1940 Statement of Principles, supra note 49, at 3. 
 79  The ABA’s Statement on Academic Freedom begins with a notation that the text of 
the statement follows the AAUP’s 1940 Statement of Principles.  ABA STANDARDS, supra 
note 68, at 161.  
 80  Id. 
 81  LAURA G. KNAPP ET. AL., NAT’L CENT. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, EMPLOYEES IN 
POSTSECONDARY INSTITUTIONS, FALL 2010, AND SALARIES OF FULL-TIME INSTRUCTIONAL 
STAFF, 2010–11, at 3 (2011), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012276.pdf.  
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report further states that 21% of all full-time professionals had 
tenure, meaning 45.6% of employees with faculty status had tenure.82  
Another 17.4% of faculty employees were on a tenure track, while 
only 15.2% of full-time faculty belonged to post-secondary schools 
without a tenure system.83  This data shows that a vast majority of 
colleges and universities across the country utilize some form of 
tenure system.  In those schools, over half of the full time faculty 
members have tenure status or are on a tenure track.  Tenure is a 
major part of American education, and any change to the substantive 
tenure doctrine will have serious implications for the institutions and 
professors participating in some form of tenure system.84  Thus, 
academic tenure’s ability to ensure academic freedom must be 
protected or else true academic freedom in American institutions of 
higher learning may begin to disappear. 
III. THE BRANHAM DECISION 
In August 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit addressed whether a professor’s tenure status afforded her 
any specific rights outside of her current employment contract in 
Branham v. Thomas M. Cooley Law School.85  The court ultimately held 
that Branham’s tenure status did not grant her any rights other than 
those enumerated in her individual employment contract for the 
most recent year.86  The ruling set a precedent against the legal 
significance of tenure status and bolstered the importance of 
employment contracts for graduate professors. 
Thomas M. Cooley Law School hired Lynn Branham as a 
criminal law professor in 1983.87  On December 21, 2005, Branham 
signed an employment contract for a twelve-month employment 
period beginning on January 1, 2006.88  Branham’s employment 
contract contained a section labeled “Rank and Title” which read: 
“The Professor shall hold the rank and title of TENURED 
PROFESSOR OF LAW with all the rights and privileges thereof, as 
defined in the Bylaws of the School or as may from time to time be 
 
 82  Id. 
 83  Id. 
 84  See generally id. (showing the large number of institutions and professors 
countrywide that participated in tenure programs as of fall 2010).  
 85  689 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2012). The Sixth Circuit subsequently denied a 
rehearing and a rehearing en banc.  Id. 
 86  Id. at 563. 
 87  Id. at 561.  
 88  Id. 
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conferred by the Board of Directors.”89  In the section labeled 
“General Provisions,” the employment contract expressly 
incorporated some of the ABA’s standards: “The current provisions 
of the American Bar Association standards governing approval of law 
schools as they relate to maximum teaching loads and other rights, 
duties, and prerogatives of faculty members shall be and become part 
of this contract by reference thereto.”90  Branham’s employment 
contract also expressly incorporated Cooley’s Policy 201—the law 
school’s policy regarding academic rank and tenure.91 
In the Spring Semester 2006, Branham taught Constitutional 
Law and Torts.92  Branham completed the semester without a 
problem although she expressed displeasure with the school 
administration for not assigning her any criminal law-related 
courses.93  In the Fall Semester 2006 she was again assigned to teach 
Constitutional Law, which she refused to teach.94  Instead, she 
requested an assignment to teach a course related to criminal law.95  
In December 2006, after Branham refused to teach her assigned 
course, Cooley dismissed Branham from her position.96  Branham’s 
employment contract required Cooley to put Branham’s dismissal to 
a faculty vote before the dismissal could be final.97  Cooley failed to 
follow this procedure, and there was no faculty vote concerning 
Branham’s dismissal.98 
Upon her dismissal, Branham filed a complaint for wrongful 
dismissal for breach of contract against Cooley in federal court.99  The 
District Court for the Western District of Michigan concluded that 
Cooley had breached the employment contract by not following the 
dismissal process required by the contract.100  The court then ordered 
 
 89  Employment Contract at 12, Branham v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., No. 
1:07-CV-630, 2010 WL 3505930 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 16, 2009). 
 90  Id. at 15. 
 91  Branham, 689 F.3d at 562; see infra text accompanying note 102. 
 92  Id. at 561. 
 93  Id. 
 94  Id. 
 95  Id. 
 96  Id. 
 97  Branham, 689 F.3d at 561.  
 98  Id. 
 99  Id.  Branham got her breach of contract claim into federal court under 
supplemental jurisdiction arising out of a concurrent ADA claim that Branham 
brought against Cooley.  Id. 
 100  Id. 
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Cooley to comply with that process.101  Cooley’s Policy 201 states: 
No tenured faculty member shall be dismissed . . . prior to the 
expiration of the term of his appointment, except for good cause 
shown and in accordance with the following procedure: 
 
(a) Notice in writing by the dean of the reasons and 
grounds for dismissal shall be served on the faculty member 
at least fourteen days prior to a meeting of the faculty 
conference at which the removal is to be considered, as 
provided in subparagraph (b) herein. 
 
(b) The Dean shall thereafter cause a meeting of the faculty 
conference to be convened for the purpose of considering 
removal of the faculty member. 
 
(c)If the faculty conference shall concur in removal, the 
faculty member shall be removed, subject to appeal to the 
academic committee of the Board of Directors.102 
 
In accordance with the court’s decision, Cooley held a faculty 
conference to debate whether adequate cause existed to dismiss 
Branham.103  The faculty concurred with Cooley’s decision to dismiss 
Branham, and the district court then ruled that Cooley had complied 
with the procedural requirements set forth in Branham’s 
employment contract.104  Although the district court found that 
Cooley had originally violated the procedural requirements 
regarding Branham’s dismissal, the court went on to rule that the 
tenure granted under Branham’s contract did not afford her rights 
beyond those specified in her employment contract.105  Branham 
appealed the district court’s decision, bringing the issue to the Sixth 
Circuit. 
 
 101  Id. 
 102  Id. at 563. 
 103  Branham, 689 F.3d at 561. 
 104  Id.  After the district court ordered Cooley to conduct the faculty conference, 
the school issued Branham a written notification of the reasons for her dismissal.  Id. 
at 563.  The faculty members at the conference voted 85–19 in favor of Branham’s 
dismissal.  Id.  The district court ruled that Cooley’s actions satisfied the procedural 
requirements for dismissal even though the faculty conference took place years after 
Branham’s original dismissal. Id. 
 105  Id. at 562. 
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A. The Sixth Circuit’s Analysis in Branham 
On appeal, Branham argued that her status as a tenured 
professor granted her a lifetime appointment or a guarantee of 
continuous employment.106  She believed that the court should have 
incorporated the ABA’s suggested tenure policies into her 
employment contract and used those policies to interpret the rights 
and protections she had regarding her employment status.107 
The Sixth Circuit began its analysis of the issue by examining 
Michigan contract law and finding that “contracts for permanent 
employment are for an indefinite period of time and are 
presumptively construed to provide employment at will.”108  
Branham’s contract was a twelve-month employment contract.109  
Therefore, under Michigan contract law, Branham’s contract was not 
a contract for permanent employment unless a specific provision of 
the contract granted her employment for an indefinite period of time 
outside of the twelve-month agreement.110  Importantly, the court did 
not find that Branham’s tenure status, which was expressly 
incorporated into the contract, granted her indefinite employment.111 
The first step the Sixth Circuit took in its analysis was to define 
the exact rights Branham’s tenure status provided her as a professor 
at Cooley.112  Due to the employment contract’s express incorporation 
of the ABA’s standards governing approval of law schools, the court 
looked to ABA Standard 405 in order to interpret the scope of 
Branham’s tenure rights.113  Standard 405 states that “[a] law school 
shall have an established and announced policy with respect to 
academic freedom and tenure . . . .”114  The ABA provides a model 
tenure standard, which, as mentioned in Part II supra, is the same 
standard as the model standard adopted by the AAUP’s 1940 
Statement.115  The Sixth Circuit reviewed the 1940 Statement but 
concluded that since the ABA articulated that the statement “is an 
example but is not obligatory,” the tenure standard set forth by the 
 
 106  Id. 
 107  Id. 
 108  Id. at 562 (quoting Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 473 N.W.2d  268, 271 
(Mich. 1991)).  
 109  Employment Contract, supra note 89, at 12. 
 110  Branham, 689 F.3d at 562. 
 111  Id. at 563. 
 112  Id. at 562. 
 113  Id. 
 114  ABA STANDARDS, supra note 68, at 32.  
 115  See id. at 33. 
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statement was not necessarily the tenure that Branham held.116  The 
court then took its analysis a step further and concluded that even if 
the tenure rights outlined in the 1940 Statement were the exact rights 
incorporated into Branham’s contract, the tenure held by Branham 
still did not afford her any special rights beyond those enumerated in 
her contract.117 
The court reached its conclusion due to a narrow reading of the 
1940 Statement.  The 1940 Statement reads “teachers . . . should have 
permanent or continuous tenure,” prompting the court to find that it 
was merely a suggestion, and not a requirement, that law schools 
grant permanent or continuous tenure.118  Therefore, absent any 
provision in the contract expressly defining Branham’s tenure as 
permanent or continuous employment, the court found that the 
language of the contract did not grant any form of permanent 
employment, and that Branham only had a contract for a twelve-
month period of employment.119  The Sixth Circuit posited that the 
tenure to which Branham’s contract referred might have meant that 
she had academic freedom, and that Cooley generally expected to 
enter into new employment contracts with her each year, but that 
Branham was not guaranteed continuous employment through her 
tenure status or her employment contract.120  After the court 
completed its analysis of Branham’s substantive tenure rights it 
affirmed the district court’s ruling that the court-ordered faculty 
conference complied with the procedural rights afforded to Branham 
under her employment contract.121 
B. The Correct Analysis of Professors’ Tenure Rights 
The Sixth Circuit erred by ruling that Branham’s tenure did not 
afford her rights beyond those specified in her most recent 
employment contract.  First, the court erroneously concluded that 
only contracts for an indefinite period of time could establish 
permanent employment.122  The court supported its reasoning by 
citing Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., which held that contracts for 
 
 116  Branham, at 562.  
 117  Id. 
 118  Id. (emphasis added).  
 119  Id. at 56263.  
 120  Id. at 563.  
 121  Id.  
 122  Branham, 689 F.3d at 562. 
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permanent employment are for an indefinite period of time.123  Thus, 
since Branham’s contract was not for an indefinite period of time, 
Branham did not enjoy any right to permanent employment.124 
The problem with the court’s reliance on Rowe is that Rowe does 
not address the concept of tenure.125  The plaintiff in Rowe was a 
saleswoman, not a graduate professor with tenure status.126  The Rowe 
court did not need to address the issue of any additional employment 
rights such as tenure.127  Therefore, while the decision that contracts 
for permanent employment are for an indefinite period of time 
remains good law, it fails to fully cover the issue of Branham’s 
substantive tenure rights.  The concept of tenure that scholars have 
promoted throughout history is that the tenured professor does not 
need to rely on contracts in order to maintain permanent 
employment.128  Tenure is the grant of a permanent employment 
status.  If the only way to ensure a prolonged promise of employment 
is to enter into an employment contract for a permanent or lengthy 
period, then the entire purpose of academic tenure becomes moot.129 
Multiple courts have found that a professor’s tenure status grants 
him employment rights on top of his current employment contract, 
and that the rights expressly outlined in employment contracts do 
not automatically limit or restrict substantive tenure rights.130  For 
example, in Collins v. Parsons College, the Supreme Court of Iowa 
ruled that a professor who was granted tenure in a one-year 
employment contract could be terminated only for just cause and on 
 
 123  473 N.W.2d. 268 (Mich. 1991). 
 124  Branham, 689 F.3d at 562.  
 125  See Rowe, 473 N.W.2d 268 at 272 (deciding whether an employer’s oral 
statements and written policy statements created an indefinite employment 
contract).  
 126  Id. at 270.   
 127  See id. at 272.   
 128  Permanent employment may better be described as indefinite employment 
with job security.  The permanent employment that tenured professors maintain is 
an employment that continues unless there is adequate cause for dismissal or the 
professor decides to leave.  Permanent employment granted by tenure status is not a 
permanent contract for employment to which both the school and the professor are 
bound.  It is a contractual option; the school is bound to employ the tenured 
professor year to year (as long as the professor decides to sign the contract), while 
the professor has the option of leaving at his own will at the end of every year. 
 129  See generally Ralph S. Brown Jr. & Jordan E. Kurland, Academic Tenure and 
Academic Freedom, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 325 (1990); Metzger, Academic Tenure in 
America, supra note 7; Van Alstyne, supra note 2. 
 130  See, e.g., Keiser v. State Bd. of Regents of Higher Educ., 630 P.2d 194 (Mont. 
1981); Collins v. Parsons Coll., 203 N.W.2d. 594 (Iowa 1973); State ex rel. Richardson 
v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Nev., 261 P.2d 515 (Nev. 1953). 
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written charges before the faculty.131  Collins had signed a one-year 
contract, which labeled him as a tenured professor even though the 
contract did not expressly define tenure.132  Upon expiration of the 
contract term, the college informed Collins that he would not be 
employed the following year.133  The college did not allege any 
adequate cause for its dismissal of Collins or make any suggestion 
that Collins’s dismissal was due to his performance.134  The court 
ruled that Collins “did not waive his right of tenure by executing 
written contracts carrying out the original agreement in individual 
years.”135  Therefore, although Collins entered into an employment 
contract for a period of only one year, he was still entitled to 
indefinite employment due to his tenure status.136  Additionally, the 
Collins court was willing to look to the general plain meaning of 
tenure in order to define what Collins’s tenure status entitled him, 
but did not need to resort to that analysis because the school’s tenure 
policies were clearly outlined in its bylaws.137 
The Supreme Court of Nevada encountered a similar tenure 
issue in State ex rel. Richardson v. Board of Regents of University of 
Nevada.138 There, the court found that the university’s bylaws 
regarding tenure were binding even if they were not enumerated in 
the professor’s individual employment contract.139  Frank Richardson 
had been an associate professor at the University of Nevada for four 
years when he was dismissed because of alleged insubordination.140  
The university’s tenure policy was outlined in a faculty bulletin 
promulgated by the Board of Regents, which stated that upon an 
associate professor’s completion of one year of service he could be re-
appointed, after which re-appointment “his employment shall continue 
under tenure.”141  The bulletin went on to state that a tenured 
 
 131  Collins, 203 N.W.2d. at 598.  
 132  Id. at 596. 
 133  Id. 
 134  Id. at 597.  
 135  Id. at 598. 
 136  Id. at 599. 
 137  Collins, 203 N.W.2d at 59798.  The court looked at the definition of tenure in 
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary: “a status granted usu. after a 
probationary period to one holding a position esp. as a teacher and protecting him 
from dismissal except for serious misconduct or incompetence determined by formal 
hearings or trial; permanent tenure.” Id. at 597. 
 138  261 P.2d 515 (Nev. 1953).  
 139  Id. 
 140  Id. at 515.  
 141  Id. at 516 (emphasis added). 
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professor may only be dismissed for cause.142  The court makes no 
mention as to whether the university expressly incorporated the 
tenure policy or Richardson’s tenure status in any of the employment 
contracts Richardson signed with the university.143  Regardless, when 
the Board of Regents was challenged on its jurisdiction regarding 
Richardson’s dismissal, the Board argued that its tenure policy was 
not binding and could be ignored whenever the Board saw fit.144 
The Supreme Court of Nevada ruled that the policy was binding, 
and stated that the rule, “having been duly established, has the force 
and effect of statute,” and that it affected all “persons holding their 
positions under contract.”145  The University of Nevada had a clear 
statement of its tenure policies, which its Board of Regents 
endorsed.146  Therefore, regardless of the rights set forth in its 
employees’ contracts, the university had a binding obligation to obey 
its tenure policy, which provided continuous employment to tenured 
professors.147 
The rights tenure status enshrines for professors is not limited to 
termination cases.  The Supreme Court of Montana ruled on a 
tenure issue that did not involve termination in Keiser v. State Board of 
Regents of Higher Education.148  Marjorie Keiser was the Director of the 
School of Home Economics at Montana State University.149  In 1975, 
Keiser signed a full academic term (twelve-month) employment 
contract, which stated that she had “continuous” tenure status.150  
Then, in 1978, the president of the University only offered Keiser a 
partial academic term (ten-month) employment contract.151  All of 
Keiser’s employment contracts had termination clauses stating that 
the school could only terminate a faculty member with continuous 
tenure if there was “adequate cause.”152  But “continuous tenure” was 
 
 142  Id. 
 143  Id. at 515. 
 144  Richardson, 261 P.2d at 517.  
 145  Id. at 518. 
 146  Id. at 516. 
 147  Id. at 518.  
 148  630 P.2d 194 (Mont. 1981).  
 149  Id. at 195.  
 150  Id. at 196.  
 151  Id.  After the 1975 contract, Keiser signed a new contract year after year with 
the identical twelve-month academic term until 1978 when the university refused to 
offer her a full term contract.  Id. 
 152  Id. at 198.  The contract also allowed for termination if the university found 
itself in financial exigency.  Id.  This Comment does not discuss financial exigency 
terminations of tenured professors, but certain terminations of tenured professors 
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not defined in any of Keiser’s contracts.153 
The court looked to the 1940 Statement issued by the AAUP in 
order to define tenure and determined that the goals of tenure were 
academic freedom and economic security, or the promise of 
indefinite employment.154  Since economic security was a goal of 
tenure, the court ruled that Keiser and Montana State University had 
that goal in mind when executing Keiser’s 1975 employment 
contract, and it ruled that a main ingredient of Keiser’s continuous 
tenure was appointment of a full academic term.155  Therefore, the 
court found that the reduction in Keiser’s academic term was a 
violation of her continuous tenure.156  Keiser’s right to continuous 
full-term employment was not expressly enumerated in any of her 
employment contracts, but the court in Keiser looked outside the 
contracts to define the scope of Keiser’s tenure rights and ultimately 
ruled that her tenure status—undefined in all of her contracts—
afforded her a specific set of protections.157 
C. The Correct Interpretation of Branham’s Tenure Rights 
The Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Branham stands in direct 
contradiction with the ruling in Collins.  Like Collins, Branham was a 
tenured professor, which was expressly stated in her employment 
contract.158  Branham also signed a contract that covered a one-year 
term of employment.159  The Sixth Circuit should have followed the 
reasoning of the Supreme Court of Iowa in Collins—ruling that while 
the employment contract only covered a one-year term, the 
professor’s tenure status afforded him continuous employment 
unless adequate cause existed for dismissal.160 
The main difference between Collins and Branham is that in 
Branham the law school most likely had adequate cause to dismiss 
Branham—her refusal to teach her assigned classes.161  But the fact 
that Cooley had adequate cause to dismiss Branham does not 
mitigate the error in the court’s analysis.  The court ruled that 
 
are valid under the financial exigency doctrine.  
 153  Id. 
 154  Keiser, 630 P.2d at 199. 
 155  Id. 
 156  Id. 
 157  Id. 
 158  Branham v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., 689 F.3d 558, 561 (6th Cir. 2012).  
 159  Id. 
 160  Collins v. Parsons Coll., 203 N.W.2d 594, 597–99 (Iowa 1973).  
 161  Branham, 689 F.3d at 561. 
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Branham’s tenure status was meaningless beyond the agreements set 
forth in her employment contract, meaning that, even if Cooley 
lacked adequate cause, it had the ability to dismiss Branham free of 
legal consequence at the expiration of her one-year employment 
contract.162  That is the exact situation that academic tenure is 
supposed to prevent. 
In Richardson, the university most likely had adequate cause to 
dismiss the professor because of insubordination, but the university 
tried to skirt its own tenure policies, and the court ruled that the 
policies were binding regardless of the professor’s contract.163  In 
Keiser, the professor’s tenure status prevented the university from 
reducing her academic term at the expiration of her employment 
contract.164  The scope of the protection that tenure affords professors 
is the core issue at stake in Branham, not the outcome of the 
professor’s employment.  Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit reached the 
correct outcome: Branham’s dismissal was proper.165  But the court 
used a flawed rationale in order to reach that outcome, and the 
ruling that emerged as a result of the court’s flawed reasoning struck 
a harsh blow to the doctrine of academic tenure. 
The Branham case is a prime example of a situation where 
administrative inefficiency forced the court to enter into an analysis 
that resulted in an errant legal ruling.  Branham’s employment 
contract granted her tenure status but did not define tenure.166  The 
contract then incorporated the ABA Standards, which provides that “a 
law school shall have an established and announced policy with 
respect to academic freedom and tenure.”167  At that point, the 
contract still did not give any definition or explanation as to what 
Cooley’s tenure status actually meant.168  The courts in Collins and 
 
 162  Id. at 563. 
 163  State ex rel. Richardson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Nev., 261 P.2d 515, 518 
(Nev. 1953).  Similar to the facts in Branham, the university in Richardson had 
adequate cause to dismiss the professor, and the school rightfully dismissed the 
professor.  Id. at 515 (explaining that Richardson was uncooperative and 
insubordinate).  But the Richardson court made sure that the correct procedures were 
taken during the dismissal in order to ensure that the university’s tenure rights 
protected professors in future situations where the university may not have adequate 
cause for dismissal.  Id. at 518. 
 164  Keiser v. State Bd. of Regents of Higher Educ., 630 P.2d 194, 199 (Mont. 
1981).  
 165  Branham, 689 F.3d at 566. 
 166  Id. at 562. 
 167  ABA STANDARDS, supra note 68, at 32. 
 168  See Employment Contract, supra note 89, at 15. 
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Richardson did not have to face this issue.169  In Collins, the court noted 
that it was unnecessary to delve into a discussion on the meaning of 
tenure because the faculty bylaws at Parsons College specifically 
stated that a tenured faculty member “could be terminated only for 
just cause, on written charges before the tenured faculty.”170  In 
Richardson, the court went as far as to rule that the university’s tenure 
policy had the force of a statute because there was a faculty bulletin, 
which expressly stated that upon reappointment after one year, an 
associate professor’s employment “shall continue under tenure.”171  
The tenure policies of both institutions clearly provided that tenured 
professors have the right to continuous employment because of their 
tenure status.172  Collins and Richardson are examples of administrative 
efficiency. 
The Michigan Court of Appeals illustrated the best example of 
how administrative efficiency can help solve problems by defining 
tenure in Bruno v. Detroit Institute of Technology.173  In that case, the 
school dismissed a professor without adequate cause, prompting the 
professor to argue that his dismissal was improper due to his tenure 
status.174  The court stated, “the answer to this question depends 
entirely upon the construction given to the language of . . . 
defendant’s tenure policy.”175  After looking to the school’s policy, the 
court found that the professor had achieved tenure status, and then 
sought to determine what that status meant.176  The school’s tenure 
policy defined tenure as “expectation of continuous appointment 
until retirement, with stipulations that it may be terminated for 
causes specifically identified in the present statement of tenure 
policy.”177  Here, the court looked to the school’s policies, found the 
policy on tenure, and made a ruling based on that policy.178  The 
Sixth Circuit was unable to perform an easy and straightforward 
analysis like the one in Bruno because Cooley’s tenure policy was not 
 
 169  See generally Branham, 689 F.3d 558; Collins v. Parsons Coll., 203 N.W.2d 594 
(Iowa 1973). 
 170  Collins, 203 N.W.2d at 597–98. 
 171  State ex rel. Richardson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Nev., 261 P.2d 515, 516 
(Nev. 1953). 
 172  See Collins, 203 N.W.2d at 597–98; Richardson, 261 P.2d at 516.  
 173  512 N.W.2d 745 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974).  
 174  Id. at 747.  
 175  Id. 
 176  Id. 
 177  Id. at 749.  
 178  Id. at 747–49. 
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clearly defined.179 
The administrative inefficiency found in the Branham case—
specifically, the lack of a clear definition of tenure in Branham’s 
employment contract or Cooley’s school policies—forced the Sixth 
Circuit to devise its own interpretation of the scope of Branham’s 
tenure rights.  Since Branham’s contract expressly incorporated the 
standards of the ABA, the court looked at the ABA’s model set of 
tenure policies—a direct copy of the AAUP’s 1940 Statement.180  The 
1940 Statement defines tenure as a means for economic security and 
states that professors “should have permanent or continuous tenure, 
and their service should be terminated only for adequate cause.”181  
Despite the 1940 Statement, the court rejected the argument that 
Cooley adopted the ABA’s model tenure policy because it found that 
the policy was merely an example for schools and not an obligation 
that they must follow.182 
The court then admitted that Cooley’s Policy 201 referred to the 
concept of tenure, but did not define it.183  The lack of a clear 
definition of tenure in the employment contract or in Cooley’s 
policies forced the court to analyze multiple tenure policies set forth 
by different organizations, and the court failed to choose the correct 
standard that applied to Branham.  Instead, the Sixth Circuit decided 
that the ABA/AAUP policy did not apply—reasoning that the policy 
was merely a model of a tenure policy, and did not necessarily 
represent the tenure Branham held.184  Thus, no right to continuous 
employment existed because there was no right to continuous 
employment in the employment contract.185  The Sixth Circuit further 
erred by claiming that, even if it incorporated the 1940 Statement into 
the employment contract, Branham would still not have been 
afforded any rights other than those explicitly laid out in her 
contract.186  The court reached this conclusion by claiming that the 
statement suggests but does not require that law schools grant 
permanent or continuous tenure.187  In Collins, Richardson, and Keiser, 
 
 179  See Branham v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch. 689 F.3d 558, 562 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 180  ABA STANDARDS, supra note 68, at 161; see also 1940 Statement of Principles, supra 
note 49.  
 181  1940 Statement of Principles, supra note 49, at 4. 
 182  Branham, 689 N.W.2d at 562. 
 183  Id. 
 184  Id. 
 185  Id. at 562–63. 
 186  Id. at 562. 
 187  Id. 
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the courts treated “tenure” and “continuous tenure” as synonymous 
terms.188  Tenure is continuous; there is no such thing as non-
continuous tenure.  Therefore, the problem with the Sixth Circuit’s 
reasoning is that Cooley had already granted Branham tenure.  Thus, 
by granting her “tenure,” Cooley granted Branham “continuous 
tenure,” and the issue as to whether the school was obligated to grant 
continuous tenure or not disappears. 
In order for the Sixth Circuit to correctly interpret the scope of 
the protections afforded to Branham by her tenure status, the court 
needed to accept the definition of tenure in the 1940 Statement.  No 
other clear definition of tenure existed in the employment contract 
or in Cooley’s bylaws.189  Thereafter, the court would have read the 
1940 Statement as a policy that granted any tenured professor 
permanent or continuous employment because the 1940 Statement 
defined tenure as a means for economic security and outlined the 
substantive and procedural rights of tenured professors.190 
The court should have held that, while the employment contract 
was a method for the school to set up a contract for payment to the 
professor, the professor’s tenure ultimately controlled her 
employment status.  In a contractual sense, tenure is a type of 
option—where the school is bound to employ the tenured professor 
if she decides to come back year after year unless there is adequate 
cause for termination, but where the professor is free to leave after 
any year without any binding obligation to the school.  As long as the 
professor has achieved tenure status, defined in the school’s bylaws, 
the designated length of the professor’s most recent employment 
contract should not govern the length of time that the school 
remains obligated to employ the professor.  In this case, Branham’s 
tenure status did afford her certain rights and protections not 
specified in her most recent employment contract, such as the right 
to continuous employment.191 
 
 188  See Keiser v. State Bd. of Regents of Higher Educ., 630 P.2d 194 (Mont. 1981); 
Collins v. Parsons Coll., 203 N.W.2d. 594 (Iowa 1973); State ex rel. Richardson v. Bd. 
of Regents of Univ. of Nev., 261 P.2d 515 (Nev. 1953). 
 189  Branham, 689 F.3d at 562. 
 190  1940 Statement of Principles, supra note 49. 
 191  As mentioned supra, Cooley most likely had adequate cause to dismiss 
Branham, but the court’s ruling will allow schools to dismiss tenured professors 
without cause at the expiration of their employment contracts.  See text accompanying 
note 161. 
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IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE BRANHAM DECISION 
The Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Branham will have adverse effects on 
the American professoriate and American education.  The first 
problem for American professors is the interpretation of academic 
tenure.  By ruling that a professor’s tenure status does not afford that 
professor any rights or protections other than those specified in the 
professor’s individual employment contract, the Sixth Circuit 
diminished the role of academic tenure.192  As much as American 
higher education has changed in the past one hundred years, the 
main goal of tenure has remained the same: to protect academic 
freedom.  This goal is still important and necessary.  Any 
diminishment in the substantive rights afforded to professors with 
tenure status will result in a diminishment of the protection of 
academic freedom in American institutions of higher learning. 
Branham allows colleges and universities discretion to grant 
professors “tenure” without also granting them the rights and 
protections that traditionally accompany tenure.193  Following the 
Branham decision, institutions will be able to appease professors by 
granting them “tenure” while circumventing the protections that 
should accompany the professors’ tenure status by: (1) not defining 
any specific tenure rights in professors’ employment contracts and 
(2) having a vague tenure policy that allows for a broad 
interpretation of whether tenure actually means continuous 
employment or not.  Cooley managed to achieve just this in Branham.  
If this ruling stands, the protections of academic tenure will wane, as 
employment security for professors will only exist in their current 
employment contracts.  Essentially, “tenure” will become a hollow 
title, rendering it a meaningless badge of seniority. 
The diminishment of academic freedom that will result from the 
destruction of the traditional academic tenure doctrine will have the 
most adverse effect on American education because professors will no 
longer have the continuous job security that allows them to introduce 
innovative thought into the classroom without fear of dismissal.  An 
educational system that makes it difficult to penalize a speaker 
reinforces the speaker’s academic freedom.194  Meanwhile, a restraint 
on academic freedom leads to a restraint on progressive thought.195  
 
 192  Branham, 689 F.3d at 563. 
 193  Id. 
 194  Brown & Kurland, supra note 129, at 329. 
 195  See Van Alstyne, supra note 2, at 330.  Van Alstyne argues that one of the main 
functions of tenure is “to maximize the freedom of the professional scholar and 
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Tenure as job security and tenure as academic freedom are linked 
such that the latter cannot truly exist without the former.  Tenure 
provides extra job security to professors because it provides a means 
to academic freedom.196  The concept of lehrfreiheit will no longer exist 
in American education if school administrations are not required to 
adhere to certain tenure standards and can control all employment 
protection through the professor’s employment contract.  Professors 
might revert to the antiquated, anti-progressive teaching styles for 
fear of losing their jobs if they promote too much non-traditional 
thinking.197  The suppression of creative thought that spurred the 
creation of the AAUP will increase as the protections afforded by 
academic tenure decrease.198 
The ruling in Branham will also incentivize professors to seek 
more contractual protections instead of the previously guaranteed 
protections of tenure.  This will mean that seasoned professors will 
constantly have their next contract agreement in mind when 
planning on what materials to teach and how to teach them, 
especially if schools choose to hire them using one-year contracts.  
Instead of teaching and researching in a comfortable and protected 
environment, professors will be pressured to prove their short-term 
worth.  Tenure is a long-term commitment that promotes long-term 
intellectual growth.  The temporal restraints that come with 
employment contracts will impede that intellectual growth. 
One potential solution to the problem in Branham is for 
institutions to clearly define their tenure policies in both their bylaws 
and employment contracts.  The bylaws should expressly state that 
the school has a tenure system (as required by the ABA),199 and then 
elaborate on what substantive and procedural protections tenure 
status gives tenured professors.200  Professors’ employment contracts 
should also state that the professor is a tenured professor and 
 
teacher to benefit society through the innovation and dissemination of perspectives 
and discoveries aided by investigations, without fear that he must accommodate his 
honest perspectives to the conventional wisdom.”  Id.   
 196  Id. 
 197  See METZGER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF THE UNIVERSITY, supra note 10, 
at 4–5.  
 198  See id. at 194. 
 199  ABA STANDARDS, supra note 68, at 32. 
 200  See, e.g., 1940 Statement of Principles, supra note 49, at 4 (“After the expiration of 
a probationary period, teachers or investigators should have permanent or 
continuous tenure, and their service should be terminated only for adequate cause, 
except in the case of retirement for age, or under extraordinary circumstances 
because of financial exigencies.”).  
BADAGLIACCABADAGLICACA PROOF.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/12/2014  1:49 PM 
2014] COMMENT 931 
 
expressly incorporate the tenure policies of the school (which should 
be clear and unambiguous) in order to eliminate any confusion as to 
what tenure means or the rights of the tenured professor.  Cooley’s 
unclear polices and employment contracts allowed the Sixth Circuit 
to enter into an errant analysis on tenure.201  The result of that 
analysis now threatens to alter and restrict American tenure doctrine. 
Cooley’s administrators have already recognized the law school’s 
victory as a gateway to impose more restrictions on tenured faculty 
members.202  In a statement released after the Sixth Circuit’s decision, 
James Robb, Cooley’s Associate Dean for Development and Alumni 
Relations, stated that “[t]he Sixth Circuit’s decision is very important 
to institutions of higher learning because it confirms that ‘tenure’ is a 
contractual concept which takes its meaning only from the language 
of the particular employment contract and from nothing else.  The 
word ‘tenure’ itself adds no gloss . . . .”203  But nowhere in the AAUP 
regulations, the ABA regulations, or the in the historical evolution of 
tenure in the United States has tenure been treated as primarily a 
contractual concept.204  It has been treated as exactly the opposite—a 
concept that lies outside the restrictions of normal employment 
standards and security.205  The judiciary needs to protect this concept 
of tenure in order to ensure that academic freedom continues to 
thrive in American colleges and universities.206  Conversely, the Sixth 
Circuit’s ruling weakens the economic security provided by academic 
tenure and, in turn, endangers academic freedom. 
V. CONTEMPORARY THOUGHTS ON ACADEMIC TENURE 
The use of the tenure-track system in American colleges and 
universities has its critics and its supporters.  The anti-tenure 
community fears that tenure provides too much job security to 
professors and allows professors to slip into a pattern of mediocrity 
without fear of dismissal.207  The pro-tenure base shares the views of 
 
 201  Branham, 689 F.3d 558.  
 202  See U.S. Court of Appeals Finds in Favor of Cooley Law School, THOMAS M. COOLEY 
LAW SCH. (Aug. 6 2012), http://www.cooley.edu/news/2012
/us_court_of_appeals_finds_in_favor_of_cooley_law_school.html.  
 203  Id.  
 204  See PART II supra.  
 205  Id. 
 206  See Van Alstyne, supra note 2, at 330.  
 207  For articles that highlight or explain the negative effects of tenure systems in 
higher education see Fishman, supra note 19; Dickinson, supra note 23, at 341–43; 
Brown & Kurland, supra note 129, at 331–33. 
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this Comment—that academic tenure protects academic freedom, 
which promotes progressive and creative thought in the classroom.208  
In recent years, the anti-tenure camp has gained some traction, and 
the Branham decision will undoubtedly add to that momentum. 
The ABA has also started showing some signs of moving away 
from its tenure policy.  In 2010 a special committee of the ABA 
proposed a revision to its guidelines on academic freedom.209  In the 
revision, the committee proposed to remove Standard 405, which 
requires all schools to establish a tenure policy.210  The committee 
characterized the change in the standards as a way to minimize 
“intrusive mandates” on schools seeking accreditation, and urged that 
schools should still protect academic freedom.211  Many law school 
professors around the country vehemently oppose this proposal.212  
The professors specifically oppose the proposal because it came only 
a few weeks after multiple groups issued lengthy statements in favor 
of preserving the existing protections.213  As of the 2012–2013 ABA 
Standards, there has been no change to the ABA’s tenure policy.214 
Apart from the ABA, a growing belief exists among American 
colleges and universities that that the education system would be 
better without tenure.215  Many institutions are moving towards hiring 
faculty members with long-term contracts instead of implementing a 
tenure-track system.216  In a survey by The Chronicle of Higher Education, 
less than a quarter of college presidents preferred full-time tenured 
professors to faculty working under long-term or annual contracts.217  
 
 208  See generally Brown & Kurland, supra note 129; Van Alstyne, supra note 2. 
 209  Scott Jaschik, Law School Professors’ Tenure in Danger?, USA TODAY (July 26, 
2010, 4:50 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2010-07-26-ihe-law-
tenure_N.htm. 
 210  Id. (stating that some members of the special committee did not believe that 
Standard 405 ever imposed a tenure requirement); but see ABA STANDARDS, supra note 
68, at 32 (“A law school shall have an established and announced policy with respect 
to academic freedom and tenure of which Appendix 1 herein is an example but is 
not obligatory.”).  Thus, while the ABA’s tenure policy example is not obligatory, a 
plain reading of the text shows that each accredited law school must have some 
established tenure policy. 
 211  Jaschik, supra note 209.  
 212  Id. 
 213  Id. 
 214  See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 68.  
 215  Jack Stripling, Most Presidents Prefer No Tenure for Majority of Faculty, CHRONICLE 
OF HIGHER EDUC. (May 15, 2011), http://chronicle.com/article/Most-Presidents-
Favor-No/127526/.  
 216  Id. 
 217  Id. 
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Proponents of long-term contracts for professors argue that tenure’s 
protections make it too difficult to get rid of incompetent faculty and 
can promote a culture of complacency among tenured professors.218  
One critic of tenure even posited that academic tenure has led to a 
dearth of practical legal training in law schools.219 
Although there has been a movement to remove tenure from 
higher education, there are still many defenders of the traditional 
concept of tenure.  Law Professor William Van Alstyne believes that 
tenure’s function as a protection for academic freedom provides 
more benefit than harm.220  Van Alstyne states, “[a]n individual who is 
subject to termination without showing of professional 
irresponsibility, irrespective of the long term of his service within his 
discipline, will to that extent hesitate publicly to expose his own 
perspectives and take from all of us that which we might more 
usefully confront and consider.”221  Therefore, at the risk of giving 
tenure to professors who may become complacent, an institution may 
force its professors to withhold progressive thought in the 
classroom.222  The occasional “deadwood” scholar, who becomes 
complacent but does not function so poorly as to warrant removal 
may exist, but this is the exception not the rule.223  Surveys show that 
tenured professors publish more, teach more, and serve on more 
committees than untenured professors.224  Tenured professors also 
tend to do a large amount of research in their field, allowing them to 
educate their students on the latest academic works and 
breakthroughs.225  Additionally, when institutions enforce their 
tenure policies properly, they will dismiss poor professors when 
adequate cause exists.226 
Contrary to what many tenure opponents believe, tenure is 
essential to prevent decline in quality amongst the professoriate.  
Tenure promotes efficiency by diminishing uncertainty regarding job 
 
 218  Id. 
 219  See Gregory M. Dickinson, Academic Tenure and the Divide Between Legal Academia 
and Legal Practice, 6 DARTMOUTH L.J. 329 (2008). 
 220  See Van Alstyne, supra note 2. 
 221  Id. at 330.  
 222  Id. 
 223  Brown & Kurland, supra note 129, at 332.  
 224  The Truth About Higher Education, NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, 
http://www.nea.org/home/33067.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2012). 
 225  Id. 
 226  See King v. Univ. of Minn., 774 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1985) (dismissing professor 
for charges of incompetent performance).  
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security.227  Tenure also promotes what Henry Rosovsky labeled the 
“social contract” of tenure.228  The “social contract” of tenure includes 
the assurance that one can work without interference, that one 
belongs to a select company of educated men and women, and that 
one can grow old without the fear of being pushed out of one’s job.229  
This concept creates a favorable climate for academic freedom.230  
Tenure also creates a business pattern called “hands-tying.”231  A 
university ties its hands so that it cannot renege just because the 
appointment of a particular faculty member was not as fruitful as the 
administration expected.232  This promotes better selection methods 
and hiring efficiency by institutions of higher learning.233  In the long 
run, institutions should benefit from this method because smart, able 
scholars will join those institutions due to the opportunity to teach at 
a high level with good job security.234  Tenure provides its own 
protection from poor professors because as difficult as it is to remove 
a tenured professor, it is just as difficult to become a tenured 
professor.  Nationally about 2% of tenured faculty members are 
dismissed each year.235  Meanwhile, the average probationary period 
for a professor at a four-year school is seven years.236  This is long 
period of evaluation, during which schools may choose not to renew 
the professor’s appointment or to dismiss the professor without 
cause.237 
The Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Branham promotes the movement 
toward long-term contract agreements for professors in place of 
tenure status.  It offers legal support for the power of the 
employment contract over the power of the generally accepted 
concept of academic tenure.  The problem with long-term contracts 
is that the protections professors would normally have under tenure 
will only exist during the term of the contract and will disappear at 
the end of the term.  This is exactly how the probationary period for 
 
 227  See Van Alstyne, supra note 2, at 331. 
 228  Brown & Kurland, supra note 129, at 333 (citing HENRY ROSOVKSY, THE 
UNIVERSITY: AN OWNER’S MANUAL 183 (1990)).  
 229  Id. 
 230  Id. 
 231  Id. at 334.  
 232  Id. 
 233  Id. 
 234  Brown & Kurland, supra note 129, at 334. 
 235  The Truth About Higher Education, supra note 224. 
 236  Id. 
 237  Id. 
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tenure works now.  The only difference is that probationary 
professors receive short-term contracts instead of long-term 
contracts.238  At the end of a contract the professor loses the 
substantive and procedural rights that would have been afforded to 
him for life if he was a tenured professor.  Tenure’s critics may 
perceive the Branham ruling as a victory for American colleges and 
universities, and a loss for the professoriate, but this is a loss for both 
sides because the positive aspects of academic tenure far outweigh 
the negative. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The founders of academic tenure in American higher education 
created tenure in order to ensure academic freedom.  They felt the 
oppression of an antiquated, authoritarian educational tradition that 
stifled progressive thought, and instilled fear in those who chanced to 
speak out against it.  The first step to protect academic freedom was 
to offer job security to the professoriate.  The first step to the 
destruction of academic freedom will be to eliminate that job 
security.  The Branham court erred in its ruling because it ruled that 
Branham’s tenure did not afford her rights beyond those specified in 
her most recent employment contract.  That ruling resulted in a 
huge blow to the job security that tenure status afforded tenured 
professors.  According to the Sixth Circuit, the substantive 
protections of tenure no longer exist unless they are specifically 
enumerated in each professor’s current employment contract.  The 
proper interpretation should have been that once Branham accepted 
her position as a tenured professor, she was entitled to continuous 
employment notwithstanding her annual employment contracts.  
Cooley may have been justified in dismissing Branham for adequate 
cause, but that does not change the validity of her tenure status 
regarding the specific rights enumerated in her most recent 
employment contract.  This interpretation is important because it 
protects professors’ tenure status and protects the vital rights that 
tenured professors receive: continuous employment and academic 
freedom. 
If left unchanged, the Branham decision will lead to the 
deterioration of tenure and the deterioration of academic freedom.  
The Sixth Circuit’s weakening of academic tenure rights will result in 
the dissipation of tenure track systems in American institutions due to 
 
 238  A contract of five years or more can be considered a long-term contract. 
BADAGLIACCA (DO NOT DELETE) 5/12/2014  1:49 PM 
936 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:905 
 
the inability of tenure to serve its main purpose to the professors.  
Professors will seek long-term contracts in order to ensure job 
stability, and true academic freedom—the ability to teach without 
fear of dismissal for teaching style or innovative classroom material—
will no longer exist.  This is a step in the wrong direction for 
American higher education.  The Branham decision is the gateway to 
the erosion of academic freedom, and the preservation of the 
academic integrity of the professoriate requires that the legislature or 
the judiciary fix the problem Branham created. 
 
